INTRO D UCTIO N
This Country Study exam ines the role of public finance in supporting a developm ent strategy for M oldova that w ould accelerate econom ic grow th, generate em ploym ent and direct resources tow ard poverty reduction. A lthough the governm ent of M oldova has already succeeded adm irably in reducing its external debt burden, its fiscal space w ill rem ain lim ited until it is able to refinance its rem aining m ultilateral and bilateral Paris Club debt. In order to do so, it needs greater cooperation from its m ultilateral and bilateral creditors. Because of its ow n efforts to reduce its external debt, the governm ent is in a stronger position w hen it begins negotiations w ith these creditors.
Independently of its debt problem , the governm ent has both the flexibility and the ability to expand its range of options. In part, its success hinges on its ability to m obilize dom estic resources. It has already done a great deal to reform its tax system , and m ore can be done to im prove revenue generation. Som e of the m ajor recom m endations of this study focus on w ays to increase revenue and m ake the structure of taxation m ore progressive.
This Country Study also m akes recom m endations on the re-allocation of public expenditures. It argues that the governm ent should assign a larger share of public expenditures to econom ic services, and to public investm ent in econom ic infrastructure in particular. Since m uch of the country' s infrastructure has deteriorated, such investm ent is badly needed. M oreover, it could im part a significant stim ulus to econom ic grow th, because appropriately designed public investm ent can ' crow d-in' private investm ent. Public investm ent can also be used to focus m ore resources on econom ic services that disproportionately benefit poor households. This w ould be the case, for exam ple, for public investm ent in irrigation and rural roads.
TH E M O BILIZATIO N O F D O M ESTIC REV ENUE
M obilizing tax revenue is crucial for im plem enting an investm ent-led Grow th and Poverty Reduction Strategy in M oldova. H ow ever, revenues of the consolidated budget w ere 24. 1 The rise in total contributions to the tw o insurance funds projected for 2007 contrasts w ith the decline in other form s of tax revenues. Revenues for social protection are increasing but not revenues to finance other essential public functions, such as providing public services and infrastructure.
Increases in expenditures for social protection can be pro-poor and are badly needed. H ow ever, as long as the com bination of debt servicing and declines in tax revenue continues, public investm ent and the provision of essential public services w ill be constrained, as w ill the grow th of incom e and hum an developm ent. Further, sustained grow th of the econom y is critical for the financing of increased social protection. A lthough increases in current expenditure, such as on social and m edical insurance, can stim ulate aggregate dem and, they do not expand the productive capacity of the econom y.
In 2004, non-tax revenues represented about 18 per cent of all revenue. H ow ever, they are projected to decline, from 6.4 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 5.7 per cent in 2007. The M inistry of Finance regards the decline as a desirable objective to stream line and rationalize the revenue system . These revenues arise from an am algam of various charges, such as road fees, charges for using state-ow ned tradem arks, fees for extracting natural resources, and paym ents for licenses. They also include net incom e from the National Bank, w hich is variable from year to year. H ow ever, if non-tax revenue is declining, then tax revenue should be boosted to com pensate for the decline.
Like other countries, M oldova has been advised to increase its reliance on indirect taxes, m ainly the Value A dded Tax. Indirect taxes now account for about 42 per cent of all state revenue. H ow ever, according to the M edium Term Expenditure Fram ew ork (M TEF), indirect taxes are projected to decline, as a ratio to GDP, from 15.2 per cent in 2003 to 13.8 per cent in 2007. The revenue generated from the Value A dded Tax, w hich accounts for about tw o thirds of all indirect taxes, should be on the rise if it is an efficient form of taxation, but its revenue is projected to increase only m arginally. These trends place an additional burden on direct taxes to raise revenue.
Value added taxes are often recom m ended as a substitute for trade taxes. But a recent study of VA T taxation and trade liberalization (Baunsgaard and Keen 2004) finds that value added taxes have been successful in com pensating for the loss of trade taxes, as a result of trade liberalization, only in high incom e countries. M iddle-incom e countries have been able to com pensate for only about 45-60 percent of the revenue lost from trade liberalization. The m ost troubling finding, how ever, is that the VA T in low incom e countries has recovered, at m ost, only about 30 per cent of the revenue lost from trade liberalization.
The incidence of the VA T has shifted increasingly tow ards im ported goods and aw ay from dom estically produced goods. In 2003, VA T revenue on im ports w as 8.7 per cent of GDP, w hile the revenue from dom estically produced goods w as 4.3 per cent. This w as a reversal of the situation in 1997, w hen the ratio for im ported goods w as 1.8 per cent and that for dom estic goods 8.8 per cent. This is partly explained by a change in 1999 to a destination m ethod of VA T taxation, w hich w as applied to im ports from CIS countries as w ell as others. H ow ever, there is a VA T refund provided on im ported goods. In 2003, for exam ple, total VA T refunds am ounted to 2.8 per cent of GDP.
Com pared to trade taxes, sales taxes on dom estic goods and services are lim ited in their revenue-raising potential in an econom y w ith a large inform al sector. A nother possible explanation for their inability to generate revenue is that the m inim um threshold for obligatory registration of VA T taxpayers has been raised, purportedly to m ake it m ore efficient.
A 2003 study of taxation in thirteen transition countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central A sia found that in 2000 M oldova had a 10 percent effective VA T rate (i.e., actual VA T collections as a ratio to the VA T base) (Stepanyan 2003, p. 15) . This rate com pared favourably to those in other countries, especially Russia, A zerbaijan and Georgia, but, nonetheless, it had declined from a high of seventeen percent in 1998. A sim ilar trend characterized the VA T efficiency rate (the effective VA T rate as a ratio to the statutory rate): it had declined from 84 percent in 1998 to 52 percent in 2000.
Because VA T is levied on im ports, foreign trade taxes have rem ained low , accounting, for exam ple, for only 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2003. Part of the reason that VA T and trade taxes together are low is the establishm ent of free trade arrangem ents w ith countries in Southeast Europe and the CIS. A nother part of the reason is that the Governm ent has refrained from raising som e im port tariffs, even though it is allow ed to do so under the W TO accession agreem ent. A verage im port tariffs are reported to be 6.5 per cent. There are no tariffs or VA T taxes on exports. For the purposes of generating badly needed revenue, rather than for trade protection, som e im port tariffs could be raised m oderately w ithout violating W TO rules.
The governm ent has attem pted to give the VA T a progressive structure by setting three rates below the standard tw enty per cent. These are: eight per cent for bread and dairy products, five per cent for agricultural and unprocessed products, and zero per cent for heat, electricity and drugs. The revenue attributable to the five and eight per cent rates represents no m ore than one fifth of the total. It is difficult to adm inister differential rates for the VA T, especially in an econom y w ith a large unrecorded inform al sector.
Som e tax specialists justify the low ering of tax rates as a m eans to encourage inform alsector activities to becom e part of the registered form al econom y. But such provisions, by them selves, are unlikely to provide a sufficient m otivation for such a change. Econom ic grow th or the reduction of unnecessary governm ent regulation is likely to be as, if not m ore, im portant. The lack of effective adm inistration probably im plies that the VA T is not as progressive as its nom inal structure w ould suggest. W hile, in theory, consum ption taxes can be m ade m ore progressive, the difficulty of collection m akes it is easier in practice to render a tax system m ore progressive by placing m ore w eight on direct taxes on incom e and w ealth.
Excise taxes represent a significant share of total tax revenue, betw een fifteen and eighteen per cent of the total after 2000. But m uch of the revenue that they generate (over forty per cent) com es from taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel. A nother thirty per cent com es from taxes on im ported vehicles, and tw elve per cent from w ine and liquor. A s a ratio to GDP, excise taxes conform to the previous patterns of decline, falling from 4.5 per cent in 1997 to 3.3 in 2003, largely because of a drop in revenue from w ine and liquor. Excise taxes are projected to decline even further in com ing years, to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2007. Boosting revenue by levying excise taxes on luxury or non-essential consum ption item s should be a priority of tax policy. The direct im pact on the poor is not likely to be substantial if the item s that are taxed, such as im ported vehicles or diesel fuel, are not directly used or consum ed by the poor.
The governm ent's strategy for boosting direct taxes is to radically reduce tax rates, on the assum ption that such a reduction w ill help broaden the tax base. Such a Neo-liberal 'supply-side' approach to taxation w ill not only dim inish the progressive structure of the tax system , but also run the risk of low ering total revenue. This is generally recognised outside the governm ent; for exam ple, the IM F has w arned against reducing the rates for direct taxes unless other form s of revenue can be generated to offset the potential losses (IM F 2002, p. 13) .
Various reasons are given for low ering the rates of direct taxes: increasing disposable incom e, encouraging inform al-sector activities to becom e registered, and creating a tax haven for foreign investm ent. Low er tax rates can, in theory, have positive incentive effects, but are not likely to com pensate fully for a substantial loss of revenue, especially from a radical and sw ift reduction of rates. Such supply-side experim ents have proven them selves to be ineffective in other countries (a notable exam ple being the United States in the 1980s and in the early 2000s). Ballooning governm ent deficits are often the im m ediate and painful result. These necessitate inevitable cuts in social protection and essential public services.
The study of taxation in transition econom ies cited above (Stepanyan 2003) finds that low ering the top m arginal tax rates on personal incom e and corporate profits has no discernible im pact on increasing tax revenue. There is no reason to believe that savings w ill respond to the low ering of tax rates on personal incom e because individuals in countries w ith low incom es or depressed incom es save m ostly for precautionary reasons. The study cannot find any evidence that business investm ent has increased because of low ered rates on corporate profits although one m ight expect at least som e m odest increase (other factors rem aining constant). Lastly, in countries w here unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent are already high, low ered tax rates on personal incom e do not induce individuals to supply m ore labour.
This study tends to put m ore em phasis on sim plifying tax system s, reducing unnecessary exem ptions or strengthening adm inistration and com pliance as a basis to raise m ore revenue. Since tax rates on personal incom e and corporate profits have already been substantially reduced in m any of the transition econom ies, further reductions are m ore likely to have negative effects on revenue collection.
The governm ent has already low ered the tax rate on corporate profits. This rate w as a m oderate tw enty-eight per cent in 2001, falling to tw enty per cent in 2004. In 2006, w ithin just tw o years, it is program m ed to drop to only fifteen per cent. This strategy is designed, in part, to induce enterprises to enter the form al econom y and declare their full profit incom es. It is also designed to m ake M oldova an attractive tax haven for foreign investors, as allegedly happened in Ireland.
A t the sam e tim e that the governm ent sharply low ers the tax rate, it projects in the M TEF that corporate tax revenue w ill increase from 10.8 per cent of all revenue in 2004 to 12.2 per cent in 2007. H ow ever, if firm s have successfully avoided a tw enty-eight per cent tax rate, there is no guarantee that they w ill abandon such avoidance at a low er rate of fifteen per cent. Nor is it certain that foreign investors w ill m ove into M oldova principally because of low corporate tax rates. M ore crucial than the tax rate is the profit opportunities that the econom y is generating, w hich in part depend on the ability of the governm ent to use public expenditures, especially public investm ent, to stim ulate the econom y. A s the econom y grow s and corporate profits increase, m oderate rates on profit incom e, such as tw enty-five per cent, should represent no significant disincentive to foreign investm ent.
Part of the problem w ith collecting corporate incom e tax is the extent of tax exem ptions. A ccording to 2003 tax returns, tax exem ptions am ounted to 315 m illion lei, and foreign investors received about 50 m illion of this total. A bout 145 m illion lei in exem ptions w ere extended to dom estic corporations to encourage investm ent in fixed assets and construction. International experience indicates that such tax incentives usually have a w eak effect on private investm ent, and serve m ainly to erode the tax base.
The reform s projected for the personal incom e tax are m uch the sam e as for the corporate incom e tax. In 2003, personal incom e up to 12,180 lei w as taxed at a ten per cent rate, 12,180-16,200 lei at fifteen per cent, and higher incom e at tw enty five per cent. The top rate reflects a reduction from the previous high of thirty-tw o per cent. The intention is that by 2007 the tax rate for low incom es w ill fall to seven per cent, for m edium incom es to ten per cent, and for high incom es to fifteen per cent (see Table 1 ). This change to very low m arginal rates m akes the system for direct taxes decidedly less progressive. W hile low -incom e persons w ill receive a three percentage points drop in their incom e tax rate, m edium -incom e persons w ill benefit by a five percentage points drop, and high-incom e persons by ten, m aking the structure considerably less progressive in a country w ith high inequality. In 2003, the ratio of the m iddle-incom e tax rate to the low -incom e rate w as 1.5, and that of the high-incom e rate to the low -incom e rate 2.5. In 2007, the first ratio w ill drop to 1.43 and the second to 2.14. These changes w ill w eaken the vertical equity of the M oldovan tax system . Those taxpayers w ith a greater ability to pay w ill enjoy relatively low er taxes. In relative term s, low er-incom e taxpayers w ill be w orse off.
If the governm ent reduces its highest m arginal tax rate for personal incom e, this rate w ill be w ell below the com parable rates for m ost other transition econom ies in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS (Table 2) . For exam ple, in 2003 the highest m arginal tax rate in Bulgaria w as tw enty-nine per cent, in Rom ania forty per cent, and in Slovenia fifty per cent. Only in Bulgaria w ould the highest rate be w ithin tw enty percentage points of M oldova' s. In W estern Europe the m arginal tax rates tended to be higher than those for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS: forty-five per cent for Italy, forty-nine per cent for Germ any, and fifty-nine for Denm ark (Table 2) . Com pared to other countries in the region, M oldova has program m ed a Neo-liberal 'supply-side' experim ent w ith its tax system that is m ost likely to be counter-productive. Table 2 also indicates that the highest corporate tax rate in M oldova in 2003 w as already the low est of the thirteen countries listed. There are other countries that have chosen the path of low corporate tax rates to attract foreign investm ent. Ireland has a tax rate of sixteen per cent on corporate incom e and Lithuania and M acedonia FYR fifteen per cent. H ow ever, the governm ent should carefully study these experim ents in order to determ ine w hether M oldova enjoys som e of the sam e advantages as Ireland, and how successful som e of the countries, such as M acedonia FYR, have been. If M oldova joins the European Union, it w ill need a tax system that generates the revenue to finance public expenditures that are com parable to the EU norm . M oldova's entry into the EU w ould be severely underm ined if it w ere view ed by existing m em bers as a tax haven to w hich com panies w ould be enticed to relocate. Reducing the corporate incom e tax rate further, to fifteen per cent, w ould place it w ell below those prevailing in m ost other European and CIS countries. M oldova could probably return its highest m arginal corporate tax rate to tw enty-five per cent, m aintain its highest m arginal personal incom e tax rate also at tw enty-five per cent, and still have a tax system relatively less progressive than those in m ost other countries in the region.
The challenge facing the Governm ent is that direct taxes (excluding social and m edical insurance contributions) have fallen as a percentage of total revenue since 1997. W hile corporate incom e taxes accounted for 8.3 per cent of total revenue in 1997, they fell to 7.7 per cent in 2003. Sim ilarly, personal incom e taxes fell from 9.6 per cent to 8.3 per cent betw een 1997 and 2003. Given these declines, it is ill advised to low er tax rates on personal and corporate incom es. This study recom m ends that the 2003 structure for personal incom e taxation (nam ely, rates of 10, 15 and 25 per cent) be m aintained, and that corporate profit taxes be returned to tw enty-five per cent. This w ould contribute to a sustainable fiscal structure consistent w ith grow th and poverty reduction.
W ealth taxes, such as real estate and land taxes, have also declined in M oldova. Together, real estate and land taxes fell from 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 0.7 in 2003. A s the econom y grow s and asset values increase, revenues from w ealth taxes should increase in im portance. This depends on better registration and m ore m arket-based valuation of property, w hich the governm ent is attem pting to im plem ent. It also depends on raising property tax rates. Such an effort could m ake the entire tax system m ore progressive, since property taxes disproportionately affect richer households.
Options w orthy of serious consideration are concerted efforts to register and tax urban real estate and raise land taxes on large farm ing enterprises. The governm ent has considered raising land taxes as a substitute for other form s of taxes, such as on farm incom es or agricultural products. This policy should be evaluated, in its ow n right, as an efficient m eans of raising revenue and shifting m ore of the incidence onto richer households. Land taxes are typically a m ore efficient m ethod for raising revenue than taxes on farm incom es, w hich are m ore difficult to m easure.
In sum m ary, the governm ent should concentrate on raising m ore tax revenue and doing so w ith a m ore progressive structure, instead of risking loss of revenue as a result of m aking the tax structure less vertically equitable. To this end, the governm ent could initiate a concerted effort to strengthen the efficiency of the VA T, w hich it has chosen as the m ainstay of its tax system , and ensure that its im pact is indeed progressive. In order to guarantee the buoyancy of the tax system as average per capita incom es continue to rise, the governm ent should m aintain its current rate structure for personal incom e. A lso, the rate on corporate profit incom e should return to tw enty-five per cent to m ake it consistent w ith the top rate for personal incom e.
In the nam e of m aking the tax system m ore efficient, m any orthodox tax reform ers have sacrificed progressivity and w eakened prospects for raising revenue. The justification is that the tax base w ill be broadened if tax rates are low ered, especially for high-incom e earners. The base for taxation is m ore likely to be broadened, how ever, by sustained and broad-based econom ic grow th and im proved tax adm inistration than by the low ering of corporate and personal incom e rates.
EX TERNAL AND INTERNAL D EBT BURD EN
The governm ent of M oldova continues to bear a substantial external debt burden that constrains its ability to allocate public revenue to stim ulate grow th and reduce poverty. The external debt is a tragic legacy of its early transition period, w hen its average incom e dropped precipitously to the level of a low -incom e country w hile international financial institutions did not offer it concessional term s for lending.
In 1992, the external public debt w as only US$16.5 m illion; but by 1997 it had ballooned to over US$ 709 m illion (Table 3) . It reached a peak of US$ 781 m illion in 2000. Since 2000, the governm ent has w orked to reduce this burden. It attem pted to buy back, at large discounts, debt ow ed to Russia's Gazprom , the H ew lett Packard corporation, and Eurobond holders. A t the sam e tim e, it sought to reschedule com m ercial credits held by banks and the rem aining Eurobonds, and reschedule the debts ow ed to bilateral creditors that w ere not part of the Paris Club. A s a result, external debt fell to about US$ 672 m illion in 2004, w hich w as 25.7 per cent of M oldova' s GDP. The governm ent paid a high price in term s of allocating funds to debt reduction that could have been used to stim ulate econom ic grow th and foster poverty reduction. This trade-off w as probably unavoidable in view of the constraints, and the governm ent can be congratulated on its success in reducing the debt to m ore m anageable proportions. In the w ake of governm ent's efforts, m ultilateral institutions now hold sixty-three per cent of M oldova's external debt, and bilateral lenders thirty-three per cent. The rem aining five per cent is com m ercial debt. M oldova w ill continue to bear a substantial debt burden as long as the International M onetary Fund does not reach agreem ent w ith the governm ent on a Poverty Reduction and Grow th Facility. W ithout such an agreem ent, the governm ent cannot begin negotiations w ith the Bretton W oods Institutions on its m ultilateral debt nor start negotiations on its Paris Club bilateral debt.
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External Public D ebt, 1992-2004 (M illion US$)
The governm ent has secured tem porary breathing room by accum ulating debt arrears and rescheduling its Eurobond debt. For full and tim ely paym ent in 2002, it w ould have been necessary to allocate sixty-tw o per cent of total public revenue to debt servicing; but the actual allocation w as lim ited to tw enty-eight per cent. It should be clear that a burden of over sixty per cent w as unacceptably large, given the other claim s on public revenue. In 2003, full debt servicing w ould have taken half of public revenue, in contrast to the tw enty-three per cent that w as actually allocated. A s a result, total arrears to external creditors rose from US$ 3.4 m illion in 2000 to US$ 69.9 m illion in 2003. Since its m ultilateral and large bilateral creditors refused to renegotiate their loans, the governm ent had no alternative to accum ulating arrears, unless it had instituted draconian cuts in social expenditure. In 2004, the governm ent m anaged to clear m ost of these arrears through rescheduling or buyback arrangem ents w ith non-Paris Club m em bers, m ultilateral creditors and Eurobond holders.
Once negotiations on the m ultilateral debt begin, the governm ent has a strong case to argue that such debt, m istakenly set on IBRD term s, should be refinanced to reflect m ore favourable IDA term s. One 2001 estim ate calculated the savings on interest paym ents alone at US$ 157 m illion (Olortegui 2001) . The governm ent can also seek rescheduling of its bilateral Paris Club debt, and use the new term s for this debt as a basis to renegotiate its rem aining com m ercial debt.
In present value term s, M oldova's external debt represented 126 per cent of its exports in 2002 (Table 4 ). This places it in the ranks of other low -incom e transition econom ies (A rm enia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, M ongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) that have a substantial external debt burden. W hile such a debt burden severely ham pers a country's ability to accelerate econom ic grow th, alm ost none of these countries qualify as 'severely indebted' under the H IPC definition. Only Kyrgyz Republic, w ith a debt-to-export ratio of 221 per cent, w ould qualify. The debt problem s of this group of low -incom e countries have received scant attention. Despite prom ises, the international developm ent agencies have not launched initiatives to significantly relieve the debt burdens of these transition countries although such an initiative should be a priority. Despite the absence of support from international financial agencies, the governm ent has succeeded in m aking its total debt burden, both external and dom estic, m ore m anageable. In 2004, its total public debt represented about thirty-seven per cent of GDP, dow n from fiftyseven per cent in 2002 (Table 5) Once discussions w ith its Paris Club bilateral creditors and its m ultilateral creditors begin, the governm ent should be in a stronger position than previously to negotiate debt relief or refinancing. Russia, a Paris Club m em ber, is M oldova's largest creditor, follow ed by the United States. Germ any, Italy and Japan hold relatively sm all outstanding loans. Som e relief on m ultilateral debt is appropriate since M oldova w as forced to accept com m ercial term s on its borrow ing w hen it should have received concessional term s. M oldova becam e eligible for concessional term s only in 1997, w ell after its deep econom ic crisis.
In order to finance its budget gap in the 1990s, w hich w as generated prim arily by external debt servicing, the governm ent had little alternative but to increase dom estic debt. This causality, nam ely, the external debt burden forcing m ore dom estic debt at high interest rates, em phasises the problem atical nature of the original IBRD-term s loans that did not create assets that w ould generate an incom e stream to repay them . The governm ent has subsequently reduced the dom estic debt, from 12.5 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 11.5 in 2004, and projects a further reduction to 8.3 per cent in 2007. This w ould be accom plished by reducing security issues, lengthening the m aturities, and repaying outstanding credits to the National Bank of M oldova. Dom estic debt becam e a serious problem during the Russian financial crisis w hen the governm ent w as forced to borrow from the central bank in order to finance the expenditures that w ere not covered by revenue. In 1998, the dom estic debt had hit a peak of 17.2 per cent of GDP.
Receipts from privatisation have not been and w ill not be adequate to reduce the dom estic debt. There are few state-ow ned assets to be privatized; and, in any case, it is not clear w hether privatisation w ould be the best option. M ore successful has been the lengthening of the m aturity of m any of the governm ent's dom estic securities from 1-2 years to 3-4 years. In late 2004, there w as an unexpected surge in dem and for governm ent T-bills, perhaps due to rem ittances, even though their interest yield w as below the inflation rate. A s long as the m aturities of securities lengthen and the dem and for them m aintains itself, servicing the dom estic debt should be m anageable. The problem is that such financing is being used, in effect, to reduce the external debt instead of financing dom estic public investm ent.
A significant rem aining debt problem is caused by m ore expensive energy im ports from Gazprom , a privately ow ned Russian com pany. This debt had its origins in 1994, w hen Gazprom raised its gas prices to w orld levels and began charging m ore for its gas supplies to M oldova Gas, w hich is also a private com pany. Because the governm ent refused, on equity grounds, to raise user prices to households and also to som e productive activities, it began to incur large losses. A s a result, the governm ent found it necessary to assum e the debt ow ed to Gazprom (w hich rose to 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1994). This debt increased alarm ingly in 1998 and 1999, reaching a peak of 39.1 per cent of GDP in 1999. Since 1999, the governm ent has reduced this ratio, dow n to 14.5 per cent of GDP in 2003. H ow ever, this percentage rem ains a substantial financial burden on the governm ent.
In sum m ary, the governm ent has m anaged to bring its external and dom estic debts under control. It has done so at a high cost-one that could have been substantially lessened had official lenders been m ore forthcom ing w ith assistance. The Bretton W oods Institutions could have easily been m ore generous in their dealings w ith M oldova. They delayed approval of the Econom ic Grow th and Poverty Reduction Strategy until late 2004, and w hen the endorsem ent cam e, it did not allow for access to key concessionary instrum ents. Should full support be received, especially from the IM F, the governm ent could seek reduction and rescheduling of the external debt ow ed to m ultilateral institutions and Paris Club bilateral creditors.
Since the governm ent has endured m uch of the pain in reducing the com m ercial and non-Paris Club bilateral com ponents of its external debt, it should be in a stronger position to lobby for favourable term s for rescheduling the rem aining part. The starting point for such negotiations is the general recognition that M oldova should have been provided w ith concessional lending, instead of non-concessional lending, beginning w ith the first loans it contracted in the early 1990s. Thus, the accum ulated interest rate differential betw een the tw o should im m ediately be forgiven. In addition to the interest resulting from the difference betw een IBRD and IDA term s, the m aturities of the non-concessional debt should im m ediately be rescheduled. The result w ould be that the net present value of M oldova's debt should drop substantially, facilitating the prospects for grow th, em ploym ent and poverty reduction. This study recom m ends that negotiations resum e on no w orse than H ouston term s, w ith the applicable rescheduling and grace periods for repaym ent and interest rates. Such term s, it should be noted, are hardly generous. Reaching a settlem ent w ould be in the interests of both the governm ent of M oldova and its creditors, and serve the com m itm ent of both to grow th, em ploym ent and poverty reduction. It w ould benefit the M oldovan people because funds that have been earm arked for debt servicing could be released to finance badly needed public investm ent in econom ic and social infrastructure and the provision of essential public services. (Table 6) , and is projected to rise further to 29.6 per cent in 2007 (Table 7) . Conversely, the ratio of capital expenditures to GDP is slated to decline from 5.1 per cent in 2000 to three per cent in 2007 (Table 7) . This does not bode w ell for sustained econom ic grow th in M oldova because public investm ent can be a pow erful stim ulus to private investm ent. M oreover, its absence tends to depress private investm ent.
TH E CO M PO SITIO N O F PUBLIC EX PEND ITURES
Part of the problem is that one third of public capital expenditures have been financed by external grants. But M oldova has no Public Investm ent Program m e to rationalize these investm ents. In order to advance national developm ent priorities, public investm ent should be reliant on the m obilization of dom estic revenues. This depends in turn on the m obilization of dom estic savings, w hich rem ain very low in M oldova. Beyond revenue generation, there is a m ore general problem of the lack of dom estic accum ulation of capital, both private and public, w hich is a foundation for long-term grow th. M oldova's heavy reliance on external assistance to finance public investm ent contributes to the fragm entation and lack of coherence of public investm ent, w hich is partly driven by dom estic priorities and partly by donor priorities. M oldova needs a consolidated and coordinated Public Investm ent Program m e that is m ore am bitious, m ore geared to investing in grow th and em ploym ent and m ore focused on poverty reduction.
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Com position of Public Expenditures (% of GD P) A n additional problem is that not all of the capital investm ent that is allocated in the budget ends up being disbursed. In 2003, only sixty-one per cent of allocated public investm ent funds w ere disbursed (IDIS Viitorul 2004, p. 25) . A further problem is that Chisinau received about seventy per cent of all capital investm ent (Ibid, p. 25), leaving rural areas, w here infrastructure is sorely lacking, w ith a sm all share of the total.
The public sector w age bill is not a m ajor factor in increasing current expenditures: it is projected to increase only slightly, from 7.7 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 8.1 per cent in 2007. Betw een 1998 and 2002, there w as a fifteen per cent reduction in the num ber of em ployees, w ith eighty per cent of this reduction com prising em ployees in education and health. This is surely not a pro-poor approach to public sector reform . H ow ever, the governm ent did raise the w ages of these low -incom e em ployees. Nonetheless, overall w ages in the public sector rem ain low .
Other sm all categories, such as subsidies to enterprises, are expected to decline or rem ain roughly constant in com ing years. Juxtaposing the increases in expenditures for social and m edical insurance w ith the decline in capital expenditures highlights current budget priorities. The governm ent has been forced to favour social protection and w elfare over grow th-inducing public investm ent because of the disastrous collapse of social provision in the 1990s. The low capital expenditure is due partly to a projected decline in external grants and credits for capital expenditures. H ow ever, if external assistance increases, it is likely to favour, in line w ith com m on donor priorities, expenditures on health and education rather than on econom ic services and investm ent. The official intention of the governm ent is to m aintain a constant level of dom estic financing of public investm ent during [2005] [2006] [2007] , and direct m uch of it to critically needed construction activities. H ow ever, the general dow nw ard trend of financing for investm ent portends a governm ent focus on the shortrun am elioration of poverty instead of its long-run substantial reduction.
An exam ination of trends in expenditures on social and econom ic services during 2000-2004 underscores the relative neglect of the econom ic services. Expenditures on both education and health increased during this period (Table 8) . By contrast, expenditures on agriculture, transport and com m unication edged dow nw ard. Overall, the share of social services in GDP increased from 19.6 per cent to 21.3 per cent w hile the share of econom ic services declined from 4.3 to 4.0 percent. Econom ic services are program m ed to decline further, to 3.2 per cent in 2007, w hile social services w ill rem ain virtually constant at 21.4 per cent. 2 Given the im portance of agriculture and agro-industry to future pro-poor grow th, the lack of expenditures on econom ic services for the sector, particularly public investm ent, is not optim al. M oreover, the lack of public investm ent in infrastructure for transport, com m unication and energy im plies an erosion of the basis for long-term sustainable grow th. Rural and agricultural infrastructure is essential for M oldova's industrial developm ent as w ell as its agricultural developm ent. Even com pared to neighbouring transition econom ies, M oldova is allocating relatively less attention to econom ic services and relatively m ore to social services. W hile this is due in part to the depth of the recession that the country has endured, such an allocation of public resources suggests that the full recovery from such a catastrophic decline w ill be m ore protracted than anticipated. TA BLE 8 Public Expenditures by Sector (percent of GD P) 
CO NCLUD ING REM ARK S
This Country Study has analysed M oldova's public finances, covering the topics of revenue generation, debt relief and expenditure allocation. One of its m ajor objectives is to help the governm ent expand 'fiscal space' to prom ote grow th, em ploym ent and poverty reduction. H ow ever, by follow ing the standard Neo-liberal advice often dispensed by international financial institutions, the governm ent has been im plem enting fiscal reform s that are, by contrast, ham pering its ability to m obilize and effectively disburse public resources.
H ence, this study takes issue w ith the governm ent's current efforts to dram atically low er rates on direct taxes. The study predicts that these reform s w ill not only w eaken the vertical equity of M oldova's tax system but also prove to be ineffectual in raising public revenue. H ence, it offers a series of alternative recom m endations, covering both indirect and direct taxes, on how to raise m ore revenue and m ake the tax system m ore progressive.
The study notes that the governm ent of M oldova has succeeded rem arkably in unilaterally reducing its external debt burden, but at trem endous cost-nam ely, not being able to safeguard or advance the w ell-being of its ow n citizens. In this regard, the study pointedly criticizes international donors for m aking the m istake of not offering the country concessional lending during the w renching years of its transition during the 1990s.
Blind to the real condition of the country, international financial institutions calculated M oldova's GDP per capita to be higher than it w as. But, during the early 1990s, the country had plum m eted, in fact, to the level of a low -incom e country. Such a m istake created a m uch larger external debt burden for M oldova w hen it had to borrow internationally to try to m itigate the w idespread m isery due to its deep recession. The study urges m ultilateral and bilateral creditors to rectify this gross m istake and reschedule M oldova's debt, taking into account the additional, and unnecessary, burden that the country shouldered w hen it had to resort to borrow ing at interest rates closer to m arket levels.
The study also recom m ends that w hile the governm ent should continue devoting resources to social protection, especially since incom es rem ain low , it should disproportionately allocate resources to econom ic services, precisely in order to stim ulate m ore grow th of incom es. The study em phasises the im portance, in general, of public investm ent, w hich can expand the productive capacity of the econom y as w ell as stim ulate aggregate dem and. W ell-designed public infrastructure can prom ote m ore private investm ent and, thus, play a central role in generating m ore grow th and em ploym ent and reducing w idespread poverty in M oldova.
